1971 USA駐聯合國大使是老布希, 看看老布希在聯合國的日子
http://www.kmf.org/williams/bushbook/bush11.html
那時是你想留下來就留得下來的?
參考文獻就請回書籍章末查詢.
The defining events in the first year of Bush's UN tenure reflected Kissinger's
geoplitical obsession with his China card. Remember that in his 1964 campaign, Bush had
stated that Red China must never be admitted to the UN and that if Peking ever obtained
the Chinese seat on the Security Council, the US must depart forthwith from the world
body. This statement came back to haunt him once or twice. His stock answer went like
this: "that was 1964, a long time ago. There's been an awful lot changed since...A
person who is unwilling to admit that changes have taken place is out of things these
days. President Nixon is not being naive in his China policy. He is recognizing the
realities of today, not the realities of seven years ago." One of the realities of
1971 was that the bankrupt British had declared themselves to be financially unable to
maintain their military presence in the Indian Ocean and the Far East, in the area
"East of Suez." Part of the timing of the Kissinger China card was dictated by
the British desire to acquire China as a counterweight to Russia and India in this vast
area of the world, and also to insure a US military presence in the Indian Ocean, as seen
later in the US development of an important base on the island of Diego Garcia.
On a world tour during 1969, Nixon had told President Yahya Khan, the dictator of
Pakistan, that his administration wanted to normalize relations with Red China and wanted
the help of the Pakistani government in exchanging messages. Regular meetings between the
US and Peking had gone on for many years in Warsaw, but what Nixon was talking about was a
total reversal of US China policy. Up until 1971, the US had recognized the government of
the Republic of China on Taiwan as the sole sovereign and legitimate authority over China.
The US, unlike Britain, France, and many other western countries, had no diplomatic
relations with the Peking Communist regime. The Chinese seat among the five permanent
members of the United Nations Security Council was held by the government in Taipei. Every
year in the early autumn there was an attempt by the non-aligned bloc to oust Taipei from
the Security Council and replace them with Peking, but so far this vote had always failed
because of US arm-twisting in Latin America and the rest of the third world. One of the
reasons that this arrangement had endured so long was the immense prestige of ROC
President Chiang Kai-Shek and the sentimental popularity of the Kuomintang in the United
States electorate. There still was a very powerful China lobby, which was especially
strong among right-wing Republicans of what had been the Taft and Knowland factions of the
party, and which Goldwater continued. Now, in the midst of the Vietnam war, with US
strategic and economic power in decline, the Anglo-American elite decided in favor of a
geopolitical alliance with China against the Soviets for the foreseeable future. This
meant that the honor of US committments to the ROC had to be dumped overboard as so much
useless ballast, whatever the domestic political consequences might be. This was the task
given to Kissinger, Nixon, and George Bush.
The maneuver on the agenda for 1971 was to oust the ROC from the UN Security and assign
their seat there to Peking. Kissinger and Nixon calculated that duplicity would insulate
them from domestic political damage: while they were opening to Peking, they would call
for a "two Chinas" policy, under which both Peking and Taipei would be
represented at the UN, at least in the General Assembly, despite the fact that this was an
alternative that both Chinese governments vehemently rejected. The US would pretend to be
fighting to keep Taipei in the UN, with George Bush leading the fake charge, but this
effort would be defeated. Then the Nixon Administration could claim that the vote in the
UN was beyond its control, comfortably resign itself to Peking in the Security Council,
and pursue the China card. What was called for was a cynical, duplicitious diplomatic
charade in which Bush would have the leading part.
This scenario was complicated by the rivalry between Secretary of State Rogers and NSC
boss Kissinger. Rogers was an old friend of Nixon, but it was of course Kissinger who made
foreign policy for Nixon and the rest of the government, and Kissinger who was
incomparably the greater evil. Between Rogers and Kissinger, Bush was unhesitatingly on
the side of Kissinger. In later Congressional testimony Ray Cline, a wheelhorse of the
Bush faction of the CIA, has tried to argue that Rogers and Bush were kept in the dark by
Nixon and Kissinger about the real nature of the US China policy. The implication is that
Bush's efforts to keep Taiwan at the UN were in good faith. According to Cline's fantastic
account, "Nixon and Kissinger actually 'undermined' the department's efforts in 1971
to save Taiwan." [fn 10] Rogers may have believed that helping Taiwan was US policy,
but Bush did not. Cline's version of these events is an insult to the intelligence of any
serious person.
The Nixon era China card took shape during July, 1971 with Kissinger's "Operation
Marco Polo I," his secret first trip to Peking. Kissinger says in his memoirs that
Bush was considered a candidate to make this journey, along with David Bruce, Elloit
Richardson, Nelson Rockefeller, and Al Haig. [fn 11] Kissinger first journeyed to India,
and then to Pakistan. From there, with the help of Yahya Khan, Kissinger went on to
Beijing for meetings with Chou En-Lai and other Chinese officals. He returned by way of
Paris, where he met with North Vietnamese negotiator Le Duc Tho at the Paris talks on
Indo-China. Returning to Washington, Kissinger briefed Nixon on his understanding with
Chou. On July 15, 1971 Nixon announced to a huge telvision and radio audience that he had
accepted "with pleasure" an invitation to visit China at some occasion before
May of 1972. He lamely assured "old friends" (meaning Chiang Kai-Shek and the
ROC government on Taiwan) that their interests would not be sacrificed. Later in he same
year, between October 16th and 26th, Kissinger undertook operation "Polo II," a
second, public visit with Chou in Peking to decide the details of Nixon's visit and hammer
out what was to become the US-PRC Shanghai Communique', the joint statement issued during
Nixon's stay. During this visit Chou cautioned Kissinger not to be disoriented by the
hostile Peking propaganda line against the US, manifestations of which were everywhere to
be seen. Anti-US slogans on the walls, said Chou, were meaningless, like "firing an
empty cannon." Nixon and Kissinger eventually journeyed to Peking in February, 1972.
It was before this backdrop that Bush waged his farcical campaign to keep Taiwan in the
UN. The State Department had stated through the mouth of Rogers on August 2 that the US
would support the admission of Red China to the UN, but would oppose the expulsion of
Taiwan. This was the so-called "two Chinas" policy. In an August 12 interview,
Bush told the Washington Post that he was working hard to line up the votes to keep Taiwan
as a UN member when the time to vote came in the fall. Responding to the obvious
impression that this was a fraud for domestic political purposes only, Bush pledged his
honor on Nixon's committment to "two Chinas.""I know for a fact that the
President wants to see the policy implemented," said Bush, apparently with a straight
face, adding that he had discussed the matter with Nixon and Kissinger at the White House
only a few days before. Bush said that he and other members of his mission had lobbied 66
countries so far, and that this figure was likely to rise to 80 by the following week.
Ultimately Bush would claim to have talked personlly with 94 delegations to get them to
let Taiwan stay, which a fellow diplomat called "a quantitative track record."
Diplomatic observers noted that the US activity was entirely confined to the
high-profile "glass palace" of the UN, and that virtually nothing was being done
by US ambassadors in capitals around the world. But Bush countered that if it were just a
question of going through the motions as a gesture for Taiwan, he would not be devoting so
much of his time and energy to the cause. The main effort was at the UN because "this
is what the UN is for," he commented. Bush said that his optimism about keeping the
Taiwan membership had increased over the past three weeks. [fn 12]
By late September, Bush was saying that he saw a better than 50-50 chance that the UN
General Assembly would seat both Chinese governments. By this time, the official US
position as enunciated by Bush was that the Security Council seat should go to Peking, but
that Taipei ought to be allowed to remain in the General Assembly. Since 1961, the US
strategy for blocking the admission of Peking had depended on a procedural defense,
obtaining a simple majority of the General Assembly for a resolution defining the seating
of Peking as an Important Question, which required a two-thirds majority in order to be
implemented. Thus, if the US could get a simple majority on the procedural vote, one third
plus one would suffice to defeat Peking on the second vote.
The General Assembly convened on September 21. Bush and his aides were running a
ludicrous all-court press on scores of delegations. Twice a day there was a State
Department briefing on the vote tally. "Yes, Burundi is with us...About Argentina
we're not sure," etc.) All this attention got Bush an appearance on "Face the
Nation", where he said that the two-China policy should be approved regardless of the
fact that both Peking and Taipei rejected it. "I don't think we have to go through
the agony of whether the Republic of China will accept or whether Peking will
accept," Bush told the interviewers. "Let the United Nations for a change do
something tha really does face up to reality and then let that decision be made by the
parties involved," said Bush with his usual inimitable rhetorical flair.
The UN debate on the China seat was scheduled to open on October 18; on October 12
Nixon gave a press conference in which he totally ignored the subject, and made no appeal
for support for Taiwan. On October 16, Kissinger departed with great fanfare for China.
Kissinger says in his memoirs that he had been encouraged to go to China by Bush, who
assured him that a highly publicized Kissinger trip to Peking would have no impact
whatever on the UN vote. On October 25, the General Assembly defeated the US resolution to
make the China seat an Important Question by a vote of 59 to 54, with 15 abstentions.
Ninety minutes later came the vote on the Albanian resolution to seat Peking and expel
Taipei, which passed by a vote of 76 to 35. Bush then cast the US vote to seat Peking, and
then hurried to escort the ROC delegate, Liu Chieh, out of the hall for the last time. The
General Assembly was the scene of a jubilant demonstration led by third world delegates
over the fact that Red China had been admitted, and even more so that the US had been
defeated. The Tanzanian delegate danced a jig in the aisle. Henry Kissinger, flying back
from Peking, got the news on his teletype and praised Bush's "valiant efforts."
Having connived in selling Taiwan down the river, it was now an easy matter for the
Nixon regime to fake a great deal of indignation for domestic political consumption about
what had happened. Nixon's spokesman Ron Ziegler declared that Nixon had been outraged by
the "spectacle" of the "cheering, handclapping, and dancing" delegates
after the vote, which Nixon had seen as a "shocking demonstration" of
undisguised glee" and "personal animosity." Notice that Ziegler had nothing
to say against the vote, or against Peking, but concentrated the fire on the third world
delegates, who were also threatened with a cutoff of US foreign aid.
This was the line that Bush would slavishly follow. On the last day of October the
papers quoted him saying that the demonstration after the vote was "something ugly,
something harsh that transcended normal disappoijntment or elation." "I really
thought we were going to win," said Bush, still with a straight face. "I'm
so...disappointed." "There wasn't just clapping and enthusiasm "after the
vote, he whined. "When I went up to speak I was hissed and booed. I don't think it's
good for the United Nations and that's the point I feel very strongly about." In the
view of a Washington Post staff writer, "the boyish looking US ambassador to the
United Nations looked considerably the worse for wear. But he still conveys the impression
of an earnest fellow tryint to be the class valedictorian, as he once was described."
[ fn 13] Bush expected the Peking delegation to arrive in new York soon, because they
probably wanted to take over the presidency of the Security Council, which rotated on a
monthly basis. "But why anybody would want an early case of chicken pox, I don't
know," said Bush.
When the Peking delegation did arrive, Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Ch'aio Kuan-hua
delivered a maiden speech full of ideological bombast along the lines of passages
Kissinger had convinced Chou to cut out of the draft text of the Shanghai communique some
days before. Kissinger then telephoned Bush to say in his own speech that the US regretted
that the Chinese had elected to inaugurate their participation in the UN by "firing
these empty cannons of rhetoric." Bush, like a ventriloquist's dummy, obediently
mouthed Kissinger's one-liner as a kind of coded message to Peking that all the public
bluster meant nothing between the two secret and increasingly public allies.
The farce of Bush's pantomime in support of the Kissinger China card very nearly turned
into the tragedy of general war later in 1971. This involved the December, 1971 war
between India and Pakistan which led to the creation of an independent state of
Bengladesh, and which must be counted as one of the least-known thermonuclear
confrontations of the US and the USSR. For Kissinger and Bush, what was at stake in this
crisis was the consolidation of the China card.
